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Free, regular, and open elections are sought-after qualities of a liberal democracy. Reading 
electoral turnout as an indicator of political engagement, though, is a reductive reading and 
can obscure entrenched levels of political disengagement. This article considers the impli-
cations of Article 21, subsection one, of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) as an assessment of political participation. There are three lines of investigation. 
First, the paper examines the model of political engagement implied within Article 21 and 
its subsequent iterations. Second, theories of political participation are linked to a study of 
civic engagement within the British parliamentary system. Third, building upon these two 
arguments, the 2016 Brexit referendum is presented as a case study to demonstrate the limi-
tations of a voter turnout measurement. Political participation must be continually 
(re)imagined, (re)constructed, and reflected upon otherwise engagement relies upon voting 
by numbers.  
 




Article 21, subsection one, of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) states that the individual has the right “to take part in the government of 
his [her] country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” (UN, 1948). 
While that right, enshrined in a plural political, social, and economic context, is 
explicit in terms of content it is not explicit in form. Even with supporting subsec-
tion three that the “will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
ment…expressed in periodic and genuine elections” (UN, 1948), the form of par-
ticipation is only loosely defined in relation to the exercise of voting. This paper 
finds difficulty with a political participation that on the one hand is universally de-
clared as having a necessary existence, structured around elected representation, 
and that, on the other hand, is asserted without a broader context of meaning. Al-
though voting is a mechanism within democratic systems, and the freedom and re-
gularity of elections should be upheld, it is not the substance of participation as this 
paper sustains.  
Examining the UK as a case study the limitations of Art. 21 emerge. On the 23 
June 2016 72.2% of the British electorate exercised their right to vote in the Brexit 
referendum and “[t]urnout at the 2019 General Election was 67.3% across the UK, 
a decrease of 1.5 percentage points from 2017 (68.8%) but still the second-highest 
turnout since 1997” (McInnes, 2020, par. 2). A recent (since 1997) and relative in-
crease in voting, however, does not indicate an increase in political engagement or 
an awareness of democracy as a deliberative process.  
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To explore the relationship between electoral practice and political participation 
this paper presents three lines of argument. The first section presents UDHR’s Art. 
21 as prescribing a form of democracy supported by free and frequent elections. 
The ramifications of Art. 21 are then traced through the European Protocol and 
British domestic law. Section two explores the consequences of Art. 21 in examin-
ing theories of political engagement shaped by elections and forms of participation 
beyond elections. Connecting Citizens (2011), a report analysing active citizenship 
in the UK, is discussed here. Section three examines the case study of political 
(dis)engagement in the Brexit Referendum by evaluating the findings of Hansard’s 
2019 Audit of Political Engagement 16 report. 
 
 
1. UDHR and political engagement 
 
It might be asked whether the UDHR’s Art. 21 specifies a particular form of po-
litical participation. Miller in his aptly named article “Is there a human right to de-
mocracy?” (2015) posits that if “we assert democracy as a human right, we are 
making a peremptory demand that certain institutions be introduced, and simulta-
neously declaring illegitimate other political institutions that do not conform to 
democratic principles” (p. 10). Miller’s argument is grounded in subsection three 
of Art. 21 that there be “periodic and genuine elections” of “universal and equal 
suffrage…by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures” (UN, 1948). On 
Miller’s understanding Art. 21 implies a liberal and open form of democracy as in-
trinsic to the right itself, such that a general right to participate directly or indirectly 
in the political life of one’s country is understood within a specific vision of de-
mocracy. A right to “take part” (UN, 1948) becomes a legitimation and perpetua-
tion of a particular model of democracy. 
To counter his claim, Miller suggests that if the UDHR does not propose a “par-
ticular set of political institutions as its embodiment” then the question is “whether 
the right has any determinate content at all, or has become simply a placeholder for 
‘whatever regime in this society is likely to protect human rights in general most 
effectively’” (2015, p. 11). Significantly, this view widens the analysis of Art. 21 to 
a consideration of the UDHR as a whole, asking what kind of political system sus-
tains the implementation of the UDHR within the context of a state. 
Christiano also assesses what kind of political system would be adequate for the 
UDHR to be upheld and brought into fruition in particular states. For Christiano 
(2011) a “minimally egalitarian democracy” (p. 175) is needed, which is a “democ-
racy that has a formal or informal constitutional structure which ensures that per-
sons are able to participate as equals in the collective decision making of their po-
litical society” (p. 146). His claim is two-fold: 
 
[f]irst, there is strong moral justification for states to realize minimally egalitarian 
democracy because such democracies are normally necessary and reliable in pro-
tecting fundamental human rights of personal integrity. Second, there is moral justi-
fication for the international community to attempt to protect and promote these 
democracies because they protect fundamental human rights and because interna-
tional protection of democracy is a plausible indirect strategy for the protection of 
the human rights to personal integrity (2011, p. 175). 
 
The latter half of Christiano’s position captures the tension surrounding Art. 
21. On the one hand, Art. 21 is received as declaration of a universal right to 
political participation in one’s country. By nature of its universality the right is 
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broadly conceived. On the other hand, underpinning that right is a political as-
piration for a type of political participation and governance that will protect the 
entirety of the UDHR. An open and liberal democracy with regular and free 
elections is implicit in the declaration of the specific right. In this way, Art. 21 
is itself taken as a key for reading the UDHR as a whole.  
Such is the commitment to democracy that the political implications of Art. 
21 are articulated in Art. 25 of the International Convention on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR), namely that: 
 
[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity…without unreasonable re-
strictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by univer-
sal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free ex-
pression of the will of the electors (UN General Assembly, 1966). 
 
Although Art. 21 of UDHR is evidently echoed in Art. 25 of the ICCPR, 
the level of political engagement expressed as a right remains at the level of 
electoral activity: be that passive (standing for election) or active (voting in 
an election). The language changes at the nineteenth session of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) where it affirms that “democracy 
is based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own politi-
cal, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all 
aspects of their lives” (UN General Assembly, 2013, p. 98). The second half 
of this citation is significant because it acknowledges political engagement 
to be full rather than partial, impacting on “all aspects” of life (UN General 
Assembly, 2013, p. 98). Emphasis, however, remains on a structural under-
standing of political engagement through elections rather than on active citi-
zenship such that the UNHRC recommends: 
 
(g) Taking active measures to provide equal access to persons with disabilities 
through means such as the identification and elimination of obstacles and barriers to 
accessibility, in order to ensure their full participation in all aspects of the democrat-
ic processes; 
(h) Taking appropriate measures and steps to amend electoral laws in order to enable 
people to vote and participate in elections, without unreasonable restrictions (UN 
General Assembly, 2013, p. 100). 
 
Even in these subsequent articulations of UDHR Art. 21 the tension remains be-
tween a universal right to “take part” (UN, 1948) that is undefined and a particular 
structural recognition of the need for regular elections.  
The relationship between the UDHR and British law must be established. First, 
it is important to state that the UDHR is meaningful in the context of British law. 
Before the completion of the Brexit transition, the UK’s Human Rights Act (1998) 
makes provision for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), stem-
ming directly from the UDHR. Britain’s withdrawal process from the European 
Union causes this provision to be reviewed. Second, Art. 21 of the UDHR, is taken 
into the HRA (1998) in Part II of the First Protocol where Art. 3 specifically treats 
the right to “free elections”, such that “the High Contracting Parties undertake to 
hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which 
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the leg-
islature” (HRA, 1998). Contained within this is a direct citation of Art. 3 of Proto-
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col No. 1 of the ECHR, which is significant considering the subsequent decision to 
leave the European Union. 
Before examining the impact of Brexit upon the incorporation of the ECHR 
Protocol, it is necessary to describe the relevance of Art. 3 within Protocol No. 1. 
Beyond a symmetry of wording, the ECHR’s Guide on Article 3 (2019) offers in-
sight into an understanding of engagement that is carried into the HRA. The Guide 
explains that the right to free elections is “subject to limitations” where “member 
States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation which varies depending on the con-
text” (Council of Europe/ECHR, p. 7). For instance, states “fix a minimum age to 
ensure that individuals taking part in the electoral process are sufficiently mature” 
(CoE/ECHR, p. 8). The Guide explicitly makes preference for democracy, sustain-
ing that “fundamental human rights and freedoms are best maintained by ‘an effec-
tive political democracy’. Since it enshrines a characteristic principle of democra-
cy, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is accordingly of prime importance in the Conven-
tion system” (CoE/ECHR, p. 5). Indeed, the right to free elections is a characteris-
tic of democracy. The claim for democracy goes further still with the Guide stating 
the need for regular elections in order “that fundamental changes in prevailing pub-
lic opinion are reflected in the opinions of the representatives of the people” 
(CoE/ECHR, p. 6). 
Although frequent elections might indicate “changes in prevailing public opi-
nion” (CoE/ECHR, p. 6) there are underlying premises taken for granted, namely, 
that (1) elections demonstrate and are determined by “public opinion” 
(CoE/ECHR, p. 6) rather than political party preference, and (2) that there is a suf-
ficient quantity of electorate to justify use of the term public. With “public opi-
nion” (CoE/ECHR, p. 6) as a driver of effective democracy other indicators of en-
gagement are crucial otherwise the model of political participation is mostly pas-
sive rather than deliberative. The Protocol ultimately rests upon a transfer of power 
in the direction of “representatives of the people” (CoE/ECHR, p. 6), which is also 
enshrined in Art. 39 and Art. 40 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(2000). In that same Charter the right “to vote and to stand as a candidate at elec-
tions” applies explicitly to the context of the European Parliament “in the Member 
State in which he or she resides” (2000, Art. 39). Art. 40 then supplements Art. 39 
in declaring the right of citizens of the Union to “vote and stand as a candidate at 
municipal elections in the Member State in which he or she resides” (2000).  
In preparation for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights is called into question and this is problematic given that the Charter con-
tains “rights similar to those of the HRA (but it goes further by including updated 
versions of ECHR rights – most notably the right to data protection)” (Zoethout, 
2018, p. 163). While the understanding is that “at least some of the acquired rights 
will continue to be protected through the Human Rights Act (HRA)”, there is no 
longer the same foundational and external safeguard for those rights because “[a]ny 
treatment of acquired rights which [the British] Parliament would endorse and in-
corporate in domestic legislation could not be judicially overturned” (Eeckhout, 
2018, pp. 171-172). Such vulnerability arises from the inability to continually pro-
tect derived EU law and from the fact that the HRA “can be repealed at any time” 
(Eeckhout, 2018, p. 172). On this analysis, it seems, rights are sustained but with 
weaker legal protection. 
In the UK Government’s analysis of the Charter in preparation for the EU 
(Withdrawal) Act (2018) these specific articles are reviewed. Referring to Art. 39 
the UK Government argues that upon leaving the EU the UK “will not have repre-
sentation at the European Parliament” and, consequently, the EU (Withdrawal) Act 
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“repeals some of the domestic legislation relating to elections to the European Par-
liament” (2017, p. 62). Art. 40 presents a different situation because it is repealed 
but also depends upon “any agreement with the EU on the rights of EU nationals in 
the UK, and of UK nationals in EU countries” (2017, p. 62). Nonetheless, it is af-
firmed that franchise within “local and devolved elections” (2017, p. 62) will be 
determined by the British Parliament and devolved legislatures.  
Arguably, the HRA now has increased significance in the protection of citizens’ 
democratic rights as Art. 39 and Art. 40 of the Charter are no longer retained from 
EU law. The HRA, of course, maintains the verbal patterning of the ECHR’s Art. 3 
of Protocol No. 1. Yet, it remains to be seen how the HRA will be upheld in prac-
tice, especially if citizens intend to challenge the UK Government according to the 
terms of the HRA, as the Government’s Political Declaration document states that 
the “future relationship should incorporate the United Kingdom’s continued com-
mitment to respect the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2019, para. 7) without explaining what is meant by “the framework”.  
 
2. Towards a dynamic understanding of political (dis)engagement 
Having outlined the legal context of political engagement, this section considers 
the theoretical debate surrounding participation. According to Kymlicka (2002) a 
vision of political engagement that is election-based became widespread after the 
Second World War whereby “[c]itizens were assumed to have a set of preferences, 
fixed prior to and independent of the political process, and the function of voting 
was simply to provide a fair decision-making procedure…for translating these pre-
existing preferences into public decisions” (p. 293). Such a model is the opposite of 
a deliberative process whereby “consensus” or “an honourable compromise” 
(Kymlicka, 2002, p. 293) are sought and citizenship extends to the civic space 
beyond a polling booth. 
Essentially, election-based measurement of political engagement moves be-
tween rational choice and normative approaches. Within a rational choice model 
individuals believe that participation is beneficial: their involvement, regarded as a 
cost, is decisive. Birch (2018) challenges this view claiming that “[g]iven the infi-
nitesimal probability of a single vote altering the electoral outcome, the individual 
cannot be said to gain anything of substantive value from voting, aside from the sa-
tisfaction of having carried out the electoral act itself” (p. 11). Conceiving of dem-
ocratic activity in a reduced lens obscures the demos in democracy. 
Within a normative model democracy’s health depends upon individuals res-
ponding to a collective identity, with supporting attitudes and behaviours built 
around democracy. According to the Connecting Citizens (2011) report, organised 
by the Hansard Society promoting parliamentary democracy, “[p]arliament can en-
gage with civil society collectively and, when it does so, an individual’s actions are 
not solely motivated by personal benefit but what is appropriate in a particular so-
cial context” (p. 43). Birch criticises this model too because “it cannot be said that 
the social norm of voting is especially strong in all social groups…we know that 
socially integrated individuals are more likely to vote than those who are socially 
isolated” (2018, p. 14). A normative approach is evident when campaigns attempt-
ing to engage so called hard-to-reach groups merely reinforce pre-existing levels of 
integration and civic isolation. 
Neither model fully describes political (dis)engagement and political scientists, 
therefore, have an important role to play in researching participation. Boswell et al. 
(2019) enter this dialogue stating that “the way we do political science needs to 
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change to allow us to tell different stories about the motivations, beliefs and prac-
tices of political actors” (p. 57). An important starting point is in asking what con-
stitutes political (dis)engagement outside the practice of voting. 
Dempsey and Johnston (2018) argue that engagement involves “campaigning, 
demonstrating, and petitioning” alongside voting, while it can also be stated that 
“individuals and groups are politically disengaged if they are not positively en-
gaged (in terms of attitudes and behaviours) with the political system” (p. 7). En-
gagement, however, is not to be understood as “approval”, rather it can “take the 
forms of (non-violent) protest and activism aimed at reform” (Dempsey and Johns-
ton, 2018, p. 5). Beyond revolts, assessments of engagement must include individ-
uals “unaware…that options for engagement exist” (Hansard Society, 2011, p. 66). 
Definitions of engagement must be comprehensive enough to incorporate the inter-
play between politics and daily life and structured enough to measure abuses of 
democracy and pockets of disengagement.  
 Connecting Citizens is an insightful report because it regards political participa-
tion as a dynamic process reinforced by continual and lifelong practice. The pre-
mise is that education citizenship must surpass a linear model in which primary and 
secondary level schooling is the time and place of political formation. Otherwise 
engagement levels become and remain normative at a relatively young age: the po-
litical actor stands still while politics continues apace. A cyclical model, in con-
trast, recognises that education “can occur at any time and is also non-linear in na-
ture” (Hansard Society, 2011, p. 46), implying that norms of political disengage-
ment can be observed and overcome at any age.  
 
Fig. 1 - An overview of the framework for engagement 
 
 
Source: Connecting Citizens to Parliament (Hansard Society, 2011, p. 47) 
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That political activity is reinforced is central to the diagram proposed in Figure 
1. The life source of the model depends upon citizens growing in awareness of, and 
responding to, “issues” that in/directly affect them either formally or informally. 
As awareness and knowledge increase citizens grow in “confidence and self-
esteem and an awareness of the benefit of participation. These factors are all enab-
lers of increased participation” (Hansard Society, 2011, p. 46). Crucially, the dia-
gram positions knowledge, through networks of influence, as leading to participa-
tion at all levels of civic society. Voting, which does not feature separately in Fig. 
1, is assumed as part of the participation process without dominating the model.  
While Fig. 1 outlines structures of political engagement, it is incomplete. The 
model presents citizens as a closed unit, while hiding dynamics of political en-
gagement and interaction. Within the “Citizens” (Fig. 1) block there should be a 
subset for interaction between citizens and citizens with political representatives. 
Including circles of interaction, failed or otherwise, would enhance this model of 
political engagement, better reflecting Smith’s (2017) vision of political participa-
tion that: 
 
must include both the means to participate in the opinion forming mechanisms of 
debate and deliberation as well as participating in the decision making 
process…Thus deliberative democracy and direct democracy are both inadequate on 
their own, as a properly participatory politics needs mechanisms to facilitate all 
means of politics, including speech, action, listening, and protest (p. 72). 
 
The importance of spheres of education, included in the model, cannot be unde-
restimated given that there are some who would obstruct participation based on a 
perceived lack of knowledge. For example, Smith observes that the “elitist argu-
ment looks at some of the worst examples of poor behaviour and uninformed polit-
ical discourse online and then draws the conclusion that most people are incapable 
of serious political activity” (2017, p. 90). This position perpetuates existing disen-
gagement without ever questioning the causes of that disengagement. As Smith 
continues “[i]f people were given a real opportunity to participate, the motivation 
to get informed becomes stronger, especially if one’s opinions will be tested in de-
bate by others who are highly knowledgeable and educated on the topic” (2017, pp. 
93-94). A dynamic and interactive model of engagement must disavow elitist at-
tempts to continue normative patterns of disengagement because the category of 
knowledge also includes experiences of not-knowing, doubt, difficulty, and confu-
sion as educational and participatory drivers rather than as obstacles. 
 
 
3. A Brexit of the politically (dis)engaged 
 
Turning specifically to the case study of the 2016 Brexit vote, this section ana-
lyses whether the strength of democratic engagement is measurable solely in terms 
of electoral turnout. Although a high proportion of the electorate (72.2%) voted in 
the Brexit referendum, those votes cannot necessarily be understood as evidence of 
political engagement. There are, at least, two ways of looking at Brexit in light of 
political disengagement. First, there is the level of disengagement that the referen-
dum vote arguably indicates. Second, there is the level of disengagement that has 
increased since the vote as the process of withdrawal has been debated. 
Hansard’s Audit (2019) makes for difficult reading in stating that while “[c]ore 
indicators of certainty to vote, and interest in and knowledge of politics, remain 
stable at average or above-average levels” since the Brexit vote, the “number who 
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‘strongly disagree’ that political involvement can change the way the UK is run 
(18%) has hit a 15-year high” (Blackwell et al., p. 6). Disconcertingly, the report 
maintains that “47% feel they have no influence at all over national decision-
making” (Blackwell et al., 2019, p. 6), which is alarming given that intentions to 
vote and levels of voting are high, as evidenced with Brexit.  
Furthermore, when presented with a list of 13 political activities after the Brexit 
vote there was a 10-point percentage increase (to 22%) in the number of people 
who would not participate in any of the listed activities compared to the previous 
year (2015). Intention to vote reported the largest decrease across the same period 
from 70% in 2015 to 58% in 2016. While 43% of the observed population would 
contact a political representative (2015), in 2016 this fell to 37%. Willingness to 
create and sign an online petition decreased from 38% to 34%, with willingness to 
contribute to an online discussion also decreasing from 21% to 16%. Worryingly, 
these are results to a question that premises that someone “feels strongly about an 
issue” (Blackwell et al., 2019, p. 22). It would be interesting to analyse levels of 
political engagement where an issue does not personally affect an individual but is 
no less important politically. 
 The data is then analysed directly in relation to Brexit voters and divided into 
categories of remain and leave. Among leave voters interest in politics and certain-
ty to vote are at 47% and 64% respectively (Blackwell et al., 2019, p. 33). For re-
main voters interest in politics is relatively higher at 73% with 80% of the same 
population expressing certainty to vote (Blackwell et al., 2019, p. 33). Intention to 
vote remains high even as there is disbelief that political participation is effective 
among both groups: 30% among leave voters and 36% for remain voters (Black-
well et al., 2019, p. 34). What emerges is a deeply rooted disengagement that high 
levels of voting and the intention to vote do not reveal. As Connecting Citizens 
(2011) concludes “it is unlikely any single initiative would be sufficient to make a 
lasting, substantive change in the levels of public engagement with Parlia-
ment...Changing levels of engagement will be an ongoing, cumulative process re-
quiring multiple strategies” (p. 43).  
Closer parity between leave and remain voters is evidenced when asked about 
levels of satisfaction with the “present system of governing” reported as 22% and 
27% respectively (Blackwell et al., 2019, p. 34). That there is little satisfaction in 
the governing body helps contextualise high levels of “certainty to vote” (Black-
well et al., 2019, p. 33) because an intention to vote is not necessarily approval of 
the governing system, but a desire to change governance through change in repre-
sentation.  
Parliament itself is highlighted as a barrier to engagement in Connecting Citi-
zens due to “arcane traditions and the complexity of its processes and procedures, 
many of which require significant amounts of knowledge and understanding not 
possessed by most of the public” (2011, p. 53). This obstacle fosters an impression 
of them and us, whereby an elite are established through their knowledge and abili-
ty to manoeuvre around “processes and procedures” (2011, p. 53) with confidence 
and ease. This view is reinforced by the example of Prime Minister’s Questions 
(PMQs) which occupy “just 30 minutes of the parliamentary week, yet has the 
strongest public association with Parliament (Hansard Society, 2011, p. 66). Thus, 
parliament’s most popularly known activity is an activity in which citizens are ab-
sent, disengaged, and passive. Parvin (2018) observes that “politics is too divorced 
from their [citizens’] own lives to be meaningful. They talk about feeling cut off 
from the political process” (p. 37). In a move to close the gap some maintain that 
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Brexit was about “‘taking back control’ — [with] voters showing their disdain si-
multaneously for Brussels and Westminster” (Gietel-Basten, 2016, p. 678).  
To a certain extent, it might be claimed that political engagement cannot be 
measured through electoral participation because, as with Brexit, voting is not nec-
essarily an indicator of political interest, knowledge, or a conviction in the govern-
ing system. Indeed, if 72.2% voted, then a crude reading of the electorate would be 
that 27.8% are disengaged. Nevertheless, as this paper suggests, the 72.2% cannot 
be understood to be politically engaged merely because they voted. By extension, 
the 27.8% cannot be understood to be politically disengaged either (1) at all, or (2) 





This paper has sought to evidence the limitations of Art. 21 of the UDHR as an 
undefined right to “take part” (UN, 1948) in the political life of one’s country. The 
call for political participation through elections is a structural approach to engage-
ment, which is understandable in a context where states are newly emerging and 
transitioning as democracies. There is a clear need to quantify and measure the 
process of democratisation. Even so, relying on a structural level alone does not 
acknowledge diverse forms of political involvement and disengagement at a formal 
and informal level. The risk is that high voter turnout masks pockets of disengage-
ment that will not be resolved by an increase in turnout. It cannot be presumed that 
voting is an indicator of engagement if one adopts a dynamic and deliberative ap-
proach. As the House of Lords found in their The Ties that Bind report (2018) 
“[w]hilst voting is an important part of the democratic process it is far from being 
the only part” (p. 71).  
Mount in the headline to his Evening Standard article after the referendum re-
sult makes his position clear: that there is “[n]o going back on Brexit — the biggest 
British vote in history for anything” (2016). Even if there is no “going back” 
(Mount, 2016), there must be a different way of moving forwards democratically in 
terms of civic engagement because political participation cannot be contained, de-
termined, or fully expressed in a ballot. As the end of the transition period facilitat-
ing the withdrawal of the UK from the EU draws near, and as the HRA is presented 
through a “framework” (UK Government, 2019, para. 7) but without the safeguard 
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